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Towards resolving the role of governance in economic development, a model of factual-
counterfactual analysis was formulated to determine  the  relative  preference of two different 
regimes for agriculture in the public expenditure budget of developing countries. Application to 
Nigeria produced results indicating that (a) the military showed greater preference for capital 
allocations to agriculture in the budget while the civil regime showed greater preference for 
recurrent allocation, which reflects the presence of strong opposition during the civilian regime 
that tends to over blow the size of civil service workforce engaged in agricultural policy 
administration together with the attendant recurrent commitments such as personal emoluments 
and general overhead; and (b) on the whole the civil regime reveals greater preference in terms 
of the total budget than the military regime, which suggests that the incremental recurrent 
expenditure during the civilian regime more than offsets the incremental capital expenditure 
during the military regime. Thus the scope for budget restructuring in favour agricultural growth 
through higher capital allocations in the public expenditure budget exists in the present 
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Introduction 
The resurgence of analytical attention on the policy environments for agricultural 
development owes largely to the evidenced failure of the perennial focus on technology 
environments to yield desired results in developing countries. A copious instance is the 
failure of green revolution technologies to significantly contribute to food security in Africa 
as it did in Asia and other parts of the world (Ayoola 2004, CTA 2000). Particularly within 
this context the role of public expenditure budget as an instrument of agricultural policy 
becomes visible, which is an aspect of the on-going debate on the nexus between governance 
and economic development. Hence the  concerns of  Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)  and  African Union (AU) to stipulate some minimum floors (20% and  25% 
respectively) as mandatory allocations to agriculture in the national budget of developing 
countries. However these and other recommendations bordering on the best budget practices 
and other non-budget governance issues have been generally ignored, which accounts for the 
persistence of sluggish agriculture in these countries.  
 
Specifically in the ensuing debate the question is being asked, whether or not the widespread 
cases of military governance in Africa in recent past had a role to play in the poor budget 
performance of the countries involved. Certainly this question has emanated in the case of 
Nigeria based on progress recorded in terms higher growth rates of agriculture following the 
regime change from a continuous 15-year  military  regime  to  the present civilian  regime. 
Hitherto, the successive groups of military officers in the country had often predicated their 
perceived need for radical regime change on the need to improve governance, with particular 
reference to budget performance. 
 
 At the present stage the main problem pertains to the analytics of these issues, especially the 
methodological aspects of formulating appropriate model structures for  tracing  regime change effects on the public agricultural budget. Initially a stylized human development 
index of the UNDP type was constructed to track the reform-induced changes in the budget 
structure under the military regime (Ayoola 1992). However the analysis was largely focused 
on determining the scope of the active budget restructuring in favour of social services rather 
than on tracking the accruing budget savings or waste reductions as sources of incremental 
allocations to agriculture in the public expenditure budget. Also, a more robust analytical 
model of agricultural performance of the public expenditure budget  was  subsequently 
formulated and applied  to Nigerian data (Ayoola and Oboh  1999) based on the “Stone-
Geary” utility functions (Henderson  1980). But also the outcome of the analysis failed to 
attribute the observed effect of budget changes to regime changes explicitly as desired. 
  
Therefore this study proposes an alternative model of the analysis in terms of the factual-
counterfactual  trends,  with a view to estimating the time line of the relative  attention 
accorded agriculture in the budget reform  process. Specifically the model  has the added 
advantage to answer the question of whether agriculture budget policy is regime neutral or 
not, thereby yielding an empirical basis to address the implications of regime changes for 
agricultural performance of developing countries in financial budgets. It is envisaged that the 
results of the study would help in specifying the point of convergence of policy and politics 
in  the  development process, thereby representing a definite contribution of agricultural 
economics to critical policy issues.  
  
The Formal Model 
The factual-counterfactual model of budget analysis is akin to the popular before-and-after 
methodologies,  which is popular in the  economic  literature for policy  impact assessment 
(Kahnehman, 1982; Ayoola, 1994; Spellman, 2001).  Figure 1 describes the model structure, 
conduct and performance in terms of the following elements. 
1.  Given:  •  A budget cycle in a particular year (t) for allocating and implementing public 
funds to agriculture and non-agriculture in the economy; during the cycle the 
various agencies of the government submits budget proposals at some 
stipulated times for consideration by the apex government authorities. 
•  A  reference  regime or time frame in the past (t < t0  )  under military 
governance whereby proposed funds were allocated by discretionary approval 
without  the involvement of a  legislature;  in the circumstance the military 
authorities apply the rule of thumb in excising the choice of projects and 
financial allocations for different purposes. 
•  A  successive regime or time frame in  the  present (t0  <  t)  under the civil 
governance whereby proposed funds were allocated after a debate and vote in 
the legislature; the civil authorities follow the democratic principles 
entrenched in the constitution in exercising the choice of projects and financial 
allocations for different purposes. 
2.  Assume: 
•  That the budget process is the major source of fund to all economic sectors; 
other sources possibly include foreign aids anticipated and unanticipated as 
well as windfall revenues emanating from price increases of critical export 
commodities such as petroleum. 
•  That the different budget categories are additive and mutually reinforcing; i.e. 
the capital and recurrent heads make up the total allocation for the agricultural 
sector, without  considering the possibility of applying a portion of these to 
other sectors.  
•  That the budget allocations truly reflect the preferences of a government 
authority for agriculture in such a manner that greater funds imply higher 
commitments to food security and other concerns of the people. •  That the revealed preference of the government for agriculture in the budget is 
a true reflection of the preference of the people for agricultural development, 
consistent with the theoretic social welfare function (Killick 1981). 
3.  Required: 
•  To determine if the preference of the public authorities for agriculture in the 
public expenditure budget during one regime  or  time frame is smaller or 
greater than the preference of public authorities for agriculture during another 
regime or timeframe; that is, whether or not the budget allocations follow the 
same trend as from some time past, (t: t-1< t < t0) through to the present time (t: 
t-0< t < t1); 
•  To determine if the preference of public authorities during a given régime or 
time frame is the same or different for different budget categories during the 
same regime or timeframe, and during another regime or time frame; that is, 
whether or not the budget allocations follow the same trend within the same 
regime or timeframe (either t-1< t < t0 or t-0< t < t1) or between two regimes or 
time frame. 
4.  Construct: 
•  A different trend line for each of the two regimes or time frames (line AB; line 
BC); line AB* is an imaginary mirror image of the line B* representing 
another path that line AB could possibly follow instead of line AB. 
•  A projection of the trend line for the past regime or time frame (line AB) 
beyond the end point in time t-0 to the present point in time t1; hence straight 
line BD as an extension of AB.         
5.  Proof: •  Compared - the successive points in time on line BC (which is known as the 
factual) with corresponding points in time on line BD (which is known as the 
counterfactual). 
•  Determined  -  the preference for agriculture in the public budget during a 
particular regime or time frame is higher or lower than the present regime or 
time frame depending on the relative positions of the factual trend and the 
counterfactual trend. 
The model performance depends on availability of secondary data on the budget as may be 
disaggregated  in particular countries; that is, both the ex-ante and ex-post analyses of the 
data are possible within the model structure depending on whether the data include initial 
allocations or actual budget expenditures. Such data are readily available and published in 
most countries by the public agency for government statistics.  
 
In evaluating the performance of the factual-counterfactual model, we consider its simplicity 
as a measure of changes in policy variables resulting from economic reforms consequent 
upon regime changes, which is devoid of cumbersome econometric pre-conditions. 
Empirical Application to Nigeria 
In Nigeria since independence from British rule in 1960, the cumulative period of military 
regime is longer than that of civil regime: 1966-1979 (13 years); 1983-1999 (17 years). 
Under the present democratic rule (1999 till date), efforts have been made to undertake 
economic and political reforms based on democratic principles and good governance, which 
involves budget reforms and with an implicit motive to forestall further intervention by the 
military. In the reform process agriculture takes a pride of place through a budget policy that 
puts greater emphasis on farm production and export in terms of the special (presidential) 
initiatives for particular commodities. This is also consistent with policy changes in the donor 
community more towards “ownership” in aid provision. In particular this finds expression in 
the paradigm shift of the World Bank from “structural adjustment lending” to “development policy lending” as well as the EU in terms of the performance-based conditionality through 
“budget support” rather than the previous  result-based conditionality oriented towards 
intermediate targets (Zattler 2005).  
 
In this situation an analysis of budget policy of the country is predicated upon the need to 
reveal the preference of the government for agriculture in the annual budget. This would help 
address the twin concerns of the policy authorities to generate “democratic dividends” and 
the affinity of donor community for fiscal responsibility, with special reference to the 
agricultural sector of the country. 
 
Data and Analysis 
In applying the model, data were collected through secondary sources from Benue State in 
the north-central geo-political zone, which is popularly known as the “food basket” of 
Nigeria based on its vast agricultural potential. These include published and unpublished data 
on recurrent and capital estimates. Agriculture in the budget comprises the provisions for 
different heads, namely: crops and rural development; livestock; fisheries; forestry; the State 
Tractor Hiring Agency (BENTHA); the state Agricultural and Rural Development Authority 
(BENARDA); the state Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC); and, the state college 
of agriculture. The summary of the data is presented on Table 1 with some descriptive 
features of the consolidated allocations to agriculture sector in terms of the disparities 
between initial and actual allocations and between recurrent and capital allocations, across 
two governance regimes – military (1994-1999) and civilian (1999-2003). 
 
To test the null hypothesis of no difference in the allocations to agriculture between the 
military and civilian regimes, the formal model was specified and applied, first by estimating 
a set of trend equations based on simple linear regression model of the form: Y = a + bT; 
where Y represents the budget allocation to agriculture of a particular class and T is the trend 
variable in years; a and b are the shift and slope parameters respectively. One of the trend equations represents the factual  which covers the current period of civilian governance 
(2000-2004), while the other trend equation covers the past period of military governance 
(1994-1999), which when projected into the current period  represents the counterfactual. 
Thus it is possible to draw comparisons in budget allocations between the periods for given 
episodes or between the episodes for given periods. Nevertheless as generally recognized, 
mere extrapolation based on trends fails to incorporate the structural differences or changes 
implicit in the allocation behaviour of the policy authorities. 
  


















         (/budget allocation (N) The choice of five years in each case is essentially to relate the results to recent events in the 
policy environment such as the series of externally induced policy changes particularly the 
World Bank/IMF sponsored structural adjustment of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Besides, it 
is also of considerable analytical advantage that the analysis does not extend too much into 
the past, as trend projections perform poorly as we move further away from actual experience 
owing to increasing margins of error associated with regression estimates (Kmenta 1971). 
 
Results and Discussion  
The parameter estimates and predicted values are presented in Table 2. Upon projection we 
arrive at the estimates of the shift and slope parameters for separate budget periods as well as 
the predicted values and divergences of the relevant variables. The regression estimates were 
statistically significant at 5% probability level. Judging from the signs of predicted 
divergences, it appears that the civilian regime has made greater fund provision to agriculture 
than the military regime in respect of the initial recurrent allocation, actual recurrent 
allocation, initial total allocation, and actual total allocation. On the other hand, it appears that 
the military regime has made greater provision for agriculture than the military in terms of 
initial capital allocation and actual capital allocation to agriculture. 
 
On the other hand the greater recurrent allocations under the civil regime imply that budget 
policy at that time revealed greater preference for personal emoluments and overhead, ceteris 
paribus. This agrees with the observations during the current civil regime that is mostly 
preoccupied by reform measures to divest government from direct production ventures and to 
promote private sector initiatives. A notable example is the eventual privatization of the 
National Fertilizer Company (NAFCON) that represented a huge failure among similar 
public-owned enterprises in the sector financed from capital budget votes. Thus the 
consideration of capital allocations to agriculture in the public budget has manifestly reduced 
from what used to be the case under the military. Rather the burden of recurrent expenditure 
looms larger as efforts to down-size the public work force became difficult in the face of civil 
opposition and agitations against retrenchment. Table 1: Initial and Actual Allocations to Agriculture, Benue State, 1994-2003 
1 
Year  Initial allocation(Nmillions)  Actual allocation(Nmillions) 
  Capital  Recurrent  Capital   Recurrent 
1994  47.1  82.8  7.3  160.1 
1995  73.4  110.0  51.5  158.5 
1996  192.6  102.9  70.3  132.3 
1997  110.4  108.6  75.1  89.7 
1998  180.4  123.7  57.3  112.0 
1999  313.5  280.7  20.9  293.2 
2000  552.9  285.0  58.9  527.5 
2001  661.9  592.4  146.8  675.8 
2002  1166.4  746.3  106.3  703.9 
2003  1189.0  874.0  303.3  638.1 
 
                                                   
1 Source – Benue State Government Gazettes (various issues, 1994-2003); Benue State 
Government Budget Estimates (various issues, 1994-2003) 
 
 
 TABLE 2: Regression estimates and predicted parameter values of the Factual-
Counterfactual model 

















Shift estimates:             
•  Factual  0.176  2.760  0.126  0.133  0.302  0.161 
•  Counterfactual  4.880  2.020  4.800  6.620  9.700  8.660 
•  Divergence  -4.704  0.740  -4.674  -6.487  -9.398  -8.499 
Slope estimates:             
•  Factual  3.720  1.140  2.52  7.700  6.240  1.890 
•  Counterfactual  3.700  2.500  -7.8  - 2.500  -3.900  -2.200 
•  Divergence  0.020  -1.360  10.32  10.200  10.140  4.090 
Predicted values:             
•  Factual  33.656  13.020  22.806  69.433  56.462  17.171 
•  Counterfactual  56.680  37.020  -104.4  -28.382  -44.900  -22.140 
•  Divergence  -23.024  -24.000  127.206  97.813  101.362  39.311 
t – values**  34.852  12.037  73.275  121.545  165.9  39.311 
**=Significant at 1%;  
 
In any case, the greater volume of total allocation to agriculture under the civil regime 
probably suggests that the sector enjoyed high preference in terms of funding at that time 
fairs better than the military era. Thus the scope exists for budget restructuring towards better 
performance of the sector at the present level of available budget funds. For instance, a 
budget policy that directs more funds toward improving the extension information and rural infrastructure would stimulate agricultural growth faster than fund flows to non-performing 
public capital projects. 
 
Finally the results indicate that both regimes are consistent in budget implementation in the 
sense that for each budget category (capital/recurrent) the same regime has revealed 
preference for the initial allocation and actual allocation together. This suggests that there is 
no basis to infer that one regime exhibits budget discipline more or less than the other. By 
budget discipline is meant the ability of public authorities to achieve high correlations 
between the sets of initial budget allocations and the actual budget allocations. The issue 
emanates from the general observation that in several cases the initial allocations and actual 
allocations have little or no bearing to each other, so the agricultural population suffers from 
what can be termed budget illusion.  Budget illusion is characterized by euphoria among the 
people who are satisfied with the government for making initial allocations but become 
subsequently disappointed with the same government for not following through with its 
budget commitment. The presence of budget illusion in both regimes is indicated by the 
observed divergences together between the factual and counterfactual estimates at the same 
points in time. The difference is due to the fact that the military regime, having no opposition, 
tends to suppress the manifestation of budget illusion, unlike the civil regime. Indeed in the 
current times the president has faced intense criticism from the National Assembly sometimes 
bordering on threats of impeachment based on accusations of unfaithful implementation of 
the budget. This allows for budget accountability which thrives under the civil regime that 
seeks approval and reports back to the legislature on issues of budget. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Developing country agriculture depends largely on budget policy of the government in 
power, so it is important to determine the governance regimes that favour the sector more in 
the budget process. Towards this end an analytical framework based on the factual-
counterfactual helps to trace the trend of budget allocation behaviour of the government from past to the present with a view to drawing comparison on the basis of budget performance. In 
Nigeria results of the analysis indicate that the military showed greater preference for capital 
allocations to agriculture in the budget while the civil regime showed greater preference for 
recurrent expenditure. This reflects the presence of strong opposition during the civilian 
regime that tends to over blow the size of civil service workforce with the attendant recurrent 
commitments such as personal emoluments and general overhead.  
 
On the whole the civil regime reveals greater preference in terms of the total budget than the 
military regime, which suggests that the incremental recurrent expenditure during the civilian 
regime more than offsets the incremental capital expenditure during the military regime. Thus 
the  scope for budget restructuring in favour agricultural growth through higher capital 
allocations in the public expenditure budget exists in the present democratic dispensation to a 
larger extent than during the previous dictatorship under the military regime. 
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